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Abstract 
In recent years, demutualized stock exchanges have been increasingly engaging in 
M&A and alliance activities. To examine the effect of these growth strategies on 
exchange shareholders’ value creation, we focus on 14 public stock exchanges and 
investigate their short-run share price responses to the formation of 110 M&As and 
alliances all over the world spanning the period 2000-2008. Our ﬁndings show that the 
average stock price responses for M&As and alliances are positive. M&As create more 
value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value than non-equity 
alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal (cross-border) than when 
it is vertical (domestic). Additionally, there is evidence of learning-by-doing effects in 
stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that the better the shareholder 
protection, accounting standards and capital market development in the partner 
exchange’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium for our sample exchange. 
These patterns are consistent when we examine the exchanges’ long-run performance.  
Keywords:  exchanges; mergers and acquisitions; strategic alliances; joint ventures; 
network organization 
JEL classification: L22; G32; D23
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Non-technical summary 
Stock exchanges are fundamental components of modern and efficient financial 
markets. In recent years, stock exchanges have been increasingly engaging in M&A and 
alliance activities. This trend can be attributed to the continuing globalization of capital 
markets, the increased demand for a larger exchange from institutional investors, 
innovations in technology removing many physical barriers to market access. 
A key issue that has emerged is whether certain global integration activities create 
additional benefits and value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. 
Integration initiatives involving large, publicly traded stock exchanges were a relatively 
new phenomenon. Thus, there is little reliable information available to the market, or 
even to the involved exchanges themselves, about the best way of integration initiatives. 
It is also not clear which exchanges would be good at planning and executing mergers 
and alliances. The growing number of demutualized stock exchanges has also made this 
question more important and interesting as shareholders of these stock exchanges request 
management to maximize their share value. 
This paper attempts to empirically examines whether and to what extent M&As 
and alliances create value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. In 
addition, this study investigates the importance of differences in the characteristics of 
stock exchanges and integration activities in determining the valuation consequences 
across stock exchanges. 
Our results show that on average the effects for M&As and alliances are positive. 
M&As create more value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value 
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than non-equity alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal (cross-
border) than when it is vertical (domestic). Additionally, there is evidence of learning-by-
doing effects in stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that the better the 
shareholder protection, accounting standards and capital market development in the 
partner exchange’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium for our sample 
exchange. These patterns are consistent when we examine the exchanges’ long-run 
performance. 
This paper might turn out to be instructive to managers of stock exchanges about 
potential growth strategies. It might also guide investors when evaluating stock exchange 
shares. Given the importance of the stock exchange industry as a key component of 
financial markets, our study provides a better understanding on wealth effects of 
integration activities in this financial market infrastructure industry.
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1. Introduction 
Stock exchanges are fundamental components of the financial market by 
providing an efficient trading place for all investors and a necessary governance 
mechanism for all listed firms.
 3  Recently, stock exchange mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) and alliances to expand the exchanges’ businesses globally have been a trend all 
over the world since the 1990s.
4   This trend can be attributed to the continuing 
globalization of capital markets, an increased demand for a larger exchange from 
institutional investors, innovations in technology removing many physical barriers to 
market access and demutualization of exchanges to gain access to new sources of capital 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2006).
5,6  These global consolidation initiatives among stock 
exchanges may well promote competition, improve governance mechanisms, enhance the 
effectiveness of cross-border capital flows, and lower the cost of equity financing for 
listed firms and thus have the potential to benefit the markets and investors all over the 
world (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007).
 7
3  Stock exchange disclosure (rules, monitoring, and enforcement) is an important element of investor 
protection and is positively associated with financial market development (Frost et al., 2006). Moreover, 
stock exchanges often dictate corporate governance standards for listed companies (Mendiola and O’Hara, 
2003). 
4 For example, the NYSE Group and Euronext merged their businesses under a U.S. holding company, 
NYSE Euronext, to create the first trans-Atlantic equities market. In addition, Nasdaq recently announced 
an agreement to buy the Nordic stock-exchange operator, OMX. 
5 Starting in the early 1990s, stock exchanges around the world have been undergoing major organizational 
and operational changes by converting from mutual, not-for-profit organizations to publicly-traded, for-
profit firms. Following the example of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, institutions such as the Deutsche 
Börse, the London, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Toronto Stock Exchanges, and the Sydney Futures Exchange 
have demutualized. In the United States, the two largest stock markets (the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ) and the three main futures exchanges – the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board 
of Trade, and the New York Mercantile Exchange - have all adopted the for-profit form. 
6 The advent of advanced computers and other forms of communication has allowed markets to operate 
worldwide, even as the marketplace itself has changed. Compared with the traditional floor trading activity, 
remote membership, electronic order book trading, alternative trading systems, and the internalization of 
order flow by financial intermediaries all emerge in recent years. 
7 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Datar et al. (1998) find that 
liquid stocks gain more in value than illiquid stocks. 
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A key issue that has emerged is whether certain global integration activities create 
value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. Because integration 
initiatives involving large, publicly traded stock exchanges were a relatively new 
phenomenon, there is little reliable information available to the market, or even to the 
involved exchanges themselves, regarding which types of mergers and alliances would 
create the most value or which exchanges would be good at planning and executing 
mergers and alliances. The growing number of demutualized stock exchanges has also 
made this question more important and interesting as shareholders of these stock 
exchanges request management to maximize their share value.
8
Theoretically, it is still an open question whether stock exchange integration and 
co-operation create value for the stock exchange shareholders. On the one hand, 
consolidation efforts of stock exchanges can create new economies of scale to reduce 
trading costs (Arnold et al., 1999; Hasan and Malkamäki, 2001). Moreover, M&As and 
alliances between two exchanges allow for better knowledge, skills and governance 
mechanisms transfer between partner exchanges (Tasi, 2001; Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Dessein, 2005; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). Thus, shareholders can benefit from 
increased exchange revenue by attracting more investors and listing companies to 
increase trading volume and IPOs (Pagano et al., 2001; 2002).  
On the other hand, difficult global regulatory issues that emerge in such global 
integration activities may offset the above mentioned beneficial gains for shareholders. In 
particular, any integration by stock exchanges needs to overcome the barriers to capital 
flows such as market frictions and differences in the price of risk across markets (O’Brien, 
8 In 1998, only 38% of exchanges were for profit. In 2006, the number had increased to 75% (World 
Federation of Exchanges, 2007) 
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1992; Korajczyk, 1997). The consolidation of exchanges would also reduce competition 
and opportunities for cross-listings (Scheinkman, 2001), which would decrease the 
efficiency and the future revenue for the partnering exchanges. 
In this paper, we try to empirically answer this question by examining whether 
and to what extent M&As and alliances create value for the shareholders of the partnering 
stock exchanges. In addition, we investigate the importance of differences in the 
characteristics of stock exchanges and integration activities in determining the valuation 
consequences across stock exchanges. Specifically, this paper focuses on 14 public stock 
exchanges and evaluates their short–run share price responses to the formation of 110 
M&As and strategic alliances all over the world during the 2000-2008 period. In our 
sample, we consider all major stock exchanges covering 95 percent in terms of world’s 
total market capitalization. We employ a standard event study methodology using a 
market model and extend it by adding another US market return term to adapt to our 
multi-country event testing environment.  
The overall results of this study reveal that the average stock price responses for 
stock exchange M&As and alliances are positive. Stock exchange M&As create more 
value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value than non-equity 
alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal (cross-border) than when 
it is vertical (domestic). 
9
In the cross-sectional analysis, we use the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
as the dependent variable and control for deal characteristics, learning-by-doing variables, 
exchange characteristics, macroeconomic variables, technological integration levels, 
9 We define a deal as a horizontal integration if the stock exchange integrates with another exchange with 
the similar business model. 
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difference in legal system and language as well as country and year fixed effects. We 
obtain similar results to those shown in the event study. Additionally, there is evidence of 
learning-by-doing in stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that the better 
the shareholder protection, accounting standards, and capital market development in the 
partner exchange’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium for our sample 
stock exchange. These patterns are consistent when we examine the long-run 
performance measures such as the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, the change 
in ROA (ROE), the change in liquidity and the change in market capitalization of IPO 
between the year +2 and the year -2. 
This research contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, the 
research in the stock exchange industry focuses on theoretical analyses, liquidity 
measures and cost structures of financial exchanges.
10  This paper complements the 
existing literature by examining the value creation for the shareholders of partnering 
stock exchanges. Second, to date, there is no empirical evidence regarding which types of 
integrations would create the most value in the stock exchange industry or which 
exchanges would be good at planning and executing integrations. This paper might turn 
out to be instructive to managers of stock exchanges about potential growth strategies. 
This paper might also guide investors when evaluating stock exchange shares. Third, 
given the importance of the stock exchange industry as a key component of the financial 
market, our study provides a better understanding on wealth effect of integration 
10 Pirrong (1999) presents theory and evidence regarding the economics of exchanges themselves. Santos 
and Scheinkman (2001) construct a theoretical model and show that competition among exchanges leads to 
an efficient, but constrained outcome. Nielsson (2008) shows that Euronext stock exchange mergers have 
increased liquidity of the firms listed on them. Hasan and Malkamäki (2001) confirm the existence of 
economies of scale and scope among the stock exchanges.  Serifsoy (2007) reveals that diversified stock 
exchanges are mostly less efficient than exchanges that remain focused on the cash market. 
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activities this financial market infrastructure industry. Thus, this study complements the 
existing M&A and alliance research in other industries such as banking industry (DeLong, 
2001). Finally, DeLong and Deyound (2007) find that banks and investors learn by 
observing the previous bank mergers to apply that knowledge to execute and evaluate the 
subsequent mergers. Our paper complements this strand of literature by showing the 
existence of the experience effects in the integration activities of the stock exchange 
industry. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related literature and 
develops a set of hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection procedures and the 
resulting sample. Empirical results are presented in Section 4. The final section presents 
our conclusions. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Wealth effect of stock exchange M&As and alliances 
The existing literature has confirmed the existence of economies of scale and 
scope among the stock exchanges (Hasan and Malkamäki, 2001). Nielsson (2008) shows 
that Euronext stock exchange mergers have increased liquidity of the firms listed on them. 
Arnold et al. (1999) show that the mergers of US regional stock exchanges attracted 
market share and resulted in narrower bid-ask spreads. Further, Krishnamurti et al. (2003) 
argue that small and medium sized investors would be attracted to the exchange scoring 
higher on these variables: use of technology, internal control systems, transparency and 
investor protection. Thus, shareholders of stock exchanges would benefit from increased 
revenue by increased trading volume and IPOs. Additionally, M&As and alliances 
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between two exchanges enable them to acquire knowledge, skills and governance 
mechanisms from partner exchanges (Tasi, 2001; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Dessein, 
2005; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). Thus, shareholders of stock exchanges would also 
benefit from the synergy gains from improved knowledge, skills and governance 
mechanisms. 
Despite the several reasons for M&As and alliances between exchanges, stock 
exchanges cannot compete as ordinary business enterprises because of the manner in 
which they are regulated and because they function as self-regulatory organizations (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007). Thus, such deals have to incur some costs 
to overcome legal barriers to benefit from synergy gains. Such integrations also need to 
overcome the other barriers to capital flows, such as market frictions and differences of 
price of risk across markets (O’Brien, 1992; Korajczyk, 1997). The integration activities 
of exchanges would also reduce competition and opportunities for cross-listings 
(Scheinkman, 2001). This would decrease the efficiency and the future revenue for the 
partnering exchanges. In summary, it is still an empirical question whether the integration 
activity of stock exchanges will create value for their shareholders. We summarize the 
related hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The average stock price response to the announcement of a stock 
exchange integration activity (M&A, joint venture, or non-equity alliance) is positive. 
 
Another important question for shareholders of stock exchanges is that which 
growth strategy is relatively better. The available growth strategy can range from a 
simple contract (herein defined as non-equity alliance) to an M&A; joint ventures occupy 
an intermediate point. Drafting, organization and coordination costs increase as one 
becomes engaged from a non-equity alliance to an M&A. Economic efficiency implies 
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that firms prefer a non-equity alliance over an intermediate status or an M&A 
(Williamson, 1979). Agency theory makes the same prediction since non-equity alliances 
avoid the agency costs associated with management’s empire-building behavior by an 
M&A (Jensen, 1986a, b). 
On the other hand, M&As might be preferred compared to joint ventures or 
alliances in the stock exchange industry. The reason is that new companies’ listing and 
transaction fees are the most important revenue source of stock exchanges (Aggarwal, 
2002). Equity-involved integrations can allow stock exchange to get materially involved 
with the new business (Arnold et al., 1999). Based on these arguments, we investigate the 
following two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: More value accrues when the stock exchanges choose M&As over 
joint ventures. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: More value accrues when the stock exchanges choose joint 
ventures over non-equity alliances. 
 
2.2. Horizontal and vertical activities 
In recent years stock exchanges have been increasingly diversifying their 
operations into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services 
and software sales. We define a deal as a horizontal integration if the stock exchange 
integrates with another exchange with the similar business model. We define a deal as a 
vertical integration if the stock exchange integrates with another exchange with the 
different business focus. M&As and alliances between two partners with the same 
business lines enable stock exchanges to better acquire knowledge, skills and governance 
mechanisms from partner exchanges than vertical deals (Tasi, 2001; Anand and Khanna, 
2000; Dessein, 2005; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). Moreover, they enhance the stock 
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exchange’s market power in its own country or other countries. The existing literature 
(Serifsoy, 2007) has shown that exchanges that diversify into related activities are mostly 
less efficient than exchanges that remain focused on the cash market. In our paper, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: More value accrues when the stock exchanges’ integration 
activities are horizontal. 
 
2.3. Domestic and international cooperative activities 
The demand for global exchanges has grown as more and more investors, both 
large and small, have begun to look beyond their own countries' borders for investment 
opportunities (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007). Cross-border business 
opportunities are an important driver of stock exchange consolidation activities (Nielsson, 
2008). Thus, we expect that cross-border integration activities can create more value as a 
result of increased overseas business opportunities than domestic deals. Additionally, 
there is a bigger difference in use of technology, internal control systems, transparency, 
and investor protection between the two exchanges located in different countries than 
those in the same country. Thus, the synergy gain in cross-border deals should be much 
larger than that obtained in domestic integration activities. Our hypothesis can be 
formalized as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: More value accrues when the stock exchange’s integration 
activities are cross-border. 
 
2.4. Learning-by-doing effects 
The existing literature confirms that the experience matters in corporate decision 
making process. For example, Arrow (1962) and Hartley and Corcoran (1978) find that 
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the differences of efficiency between British and U.S. airframe manufacturers after 
World War II are caused by the difference in their experience. Ghemawat (1985) find that 
the experience effects also exist in other industries. The stock exchange industry is a 
highly regulated industry and strict regulation had prevented exchanges from operating 
across country borders (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007). 
Consolidations involving large, publicly traded exchanges were a relatively new 
phenomenon in the 2000s (Nielsson, 2008). There is little reliable information available 
to the market, or even to the exchanges themselves, about best practices for exchange 
growth strategies. As more exchange consolidations occur over time, however, it is 
reasonable to expect that exchanges learn to better plan and execute integration activities 
from their previous experience. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that investors learn to 
better value exchange consolidation activities as they increasingly observe and evaluate 
these initiatives. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: More value accrues when the stock exchanges have undertaken 
more previous integration activities. 
2.5. Difference in market development and governance 
In cross-border deals, the difference in stock market development and investor 
protection between the partner’ country and the sample exchange’ country might also 
influence shareholder value creation. The more developed a stock market is, the more 
liquidity it can provide. Thus, when the partnering stock exchange locates in the country 
with a more developed stock market, there should be more synergy gain for the sample 
stock exchange from increased liquidity. Similarly, the stock exchange with relatively 
low governance standards may benefit from the governance transfer effect in the process 
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of the consolidation. Specifically, stock exchanges learn to govern the firms more 
effectively from partner exchanges.
11  Frost et al. (2006) argue that stock exchange 
governance mechanism is a concrete manifestation of country-level investor protection in 
the securities markets. Thus, when the partnering stock exchange locates in the country 
with higher investor protection, there should be more synergy gain for the sample stock 
exchange from increased governance effects. In our paper, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 6a: The better market development in the partner exchange’s country, 
the higher the merger and alliance premium for the sample stock exchange. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The better country-level governance in the partner exchange’s 




3.1. Sample description 
Our sample includes 14 public stock exchanges, which have stock price data 
available in Datastream. Table 1 presents the distribution of these public stock exchange 
companies across countries. As shown in Table 1, most of the public stock exchanges are 
located in the developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Then, we collected M&A and alliance announcement data on these stock exchanges 
during the period from January 2000 to August 2008 from a number of sources such as 
the newsletters and press releases from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE, 2000-
2008) and the European Federation of Securities Exchanges (FESE, 2000-2008). Another 
important data source is the internet, press archives and ad hoc announcements of the 
individual stock exchanges involved in the integration deals. For an event to be included 
11 In the announcement of the alliance between New York Stock and Tokyo Stock Exchange, one potential 
collaboration area is regulation and governance. More details can be seen in Appendix A. 
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in the analysis, the stock price data around the event for the involved public stock 
exchange must be available in the DataStream database. If one stock exchange in the 
sample announces the purchase or an alliance with another stock exchange within six 
months of the previous announcement, we drop the subsequent one from the sample. We 
also drop 7 uncompleted M&A deals (6 acquirers are publicly traded exchanges). 
Our analysis identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances by these 14 
public stock exchanges.
12 In our sample, there are 30 M&A events. They are all at least 
partially stock-financed and there are no hostile deals. Although we only focus on 
acquirers’ stock response and exclude the targets from our sample, we investigate the 
ownership structure of target exchanges. We find that only 3 target stock exchanges are 
publicly traded companies. This result suggests that only a small percentage of exchange 
M&As combined two publicly traded exchanges. Additionally, there are 16 stock 
exchange joint ventures and 64 non-equity alliances in our sample. Two partners are both 
public stock exchanges in 4 joint ventures and 7 non-equity alliances. We include each 
partner’s announcement as one observation in our sample. Thus, in total, we have 20 
observations for joint ventures (8 observations from 4 joint ventures for which two 
partners are both public stock exchanges and 12 observations from 12 joint ventures for 
which one partner is a public stock exchange and the other one is nonpublic stock 
exchange) and 71 event observations for non-equity alliances (14 observations from 7 
non-equity alliances for which two partners are both public stock exchanges and 57 
observations from 57 non-equity alliances for which one partner is a public stock 
exchange and the other one is nonpublic stock exchange). Adding 30 observations for 
12 In total, 102 stock exchanges are involved in these deals. These account from roughly 72% of the total 
number of exchanges in the world. In terms of market capitalization, however, the stock exchanges in the 
sample represent over 95% of the universe. 
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M&As together, we have 121 observations in our sample. Each observation represents an 
integration event (M&A, joint venture, or non-equity alliance) by a single publicly traded 
exchange.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the sample events by year of announcement. 
Inspection of Table 2 shows that the number of exchange integrations is not evenly 
distributed over the 2000-2008 sample period. The largest number of announcements of 
M&A and strategic alliances in one year is 28 in 2007, followed by 20 in 2006. Panel B 
classifies the M&A and alliances. About 85% of total stock exchange integration events 
are horizontal and 90% are cross-border. These results suggest that stock exchanges 
prefer horizontal and cross-border consolidations. Panel C presents the sample events by 
the type of technological integration. The results imply that one type of technological 
integration does not dominate our sample. In addition, we provide a brief description of 
each of the types of consolidation agreements in the Appendix A. 
We also check whether alliances represent experimental organizational forms and 
would eventually evolve into joint ventures or mergers as proposed by Mody (1993). Our 
result does not support this assertion. Within four years following the formation of an 
alliance, only four of our sample alliances evolved into a more permanent form of 
relationship (Joint Ventures or M&As). This result is consistent with the findings in the 
sample of US business firms by Chan et al. (1997).
13
13 They find that within four years of the formation of an alliance, only five of their sample alliances 
evolved into a more permanent form of relationship (joint ventures or M&As). 
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3.2. Variable definition and summary statistics 
In this subsection, we discuss the measurement of four categories of variables: 
exchange performance measures, deal-specific characteristics, exchange characteristics as 
well as country-level variables that controlling for macroeconomic conditions, the 
difference in legal system and language and the difference in governance and financial 
market development.  A detailed description of the variable definitions can also be found 
in Appendix B. 
3.2.1 Exchange performance measures 
Shareholder value creation, the outcome variable of interest, can be measured in 
various ways, which are presented in the following. The objective of this study is to 
answer whether the consolidation of stock exchanges create value for exchange 
shareholders. For this purpose, we use the variable CAR[-1,1] to represent the three-day 
announcement abnormal return calculated based on the extended market model. The 
extended market model parameters are estimated over the period (-150, -31).
14
Examining short-run stock price response instead of the long-run performance measures, 
enables us to keep more observations in our sample. 
Nonetheless, to append to the overall shareholder value creation discussion, the 
three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR1, 36) is introduced in Section 5.2, which 
captures the long-term dimension of shareholder value creation. In Section 5.3, we also 
introduce the variable, the difference in industry-adjusted ROE (ROA) between the year 
+2 and the year -2 to measure the change of exchange accounting performance. In 
Section 5.4, we introduce the variable, the difference in industry-adjusted value of share 
14 A more detailed description of this measure can be found in section 5.1.1. 
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trading scaled by market capitalization of listed firms between the year +2 and the year -2 
to measure the change of exchange liquidity. To measure the change of IPO volume, we 
introduce the variable, the difference in industry-adjusted market capitalization of IPO 
scaled by market capitalization of listed firms between the year +2 and the year -2. 
3.2.2. Deal characteristics 
In our estimation, we control for several deal characteristics as follows. InterType
is equal to 0 when the deal is an M&A, 1 when the deal is a joint venture, and 2 when the 
deal is a non-equity alliance. CrossBorder is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when 
the deal is a cross-border transaction, and is otherwise 0. Horizontal is a dummy variable, 
which equals 1 when the deal is a horizontal transaction, and is otherwise 0. Public is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 when the partner is a publicly traded exchange, and is 
otherwise 0. TechnologicalIntegration is a series of dummy variables to indicate the type 
of technological integration, i.e. outsourcing, common access, common systems, common 
operations, complete system integration, and other type of integration.
15
3.2.3. Learning-by-doing variables 
Stock exchanges might engage in several integration activities during our sample 
period. By this, exchanges can learn lessons and build up institutional experience from 
these activities. We construct and include the variables, which measure the number of 
stock exchange own integration activities during the previous period to control for the 
potential effects of active, internal learning by doing. Specifically, NoPreMA is the 
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number of previous M&A events experienced by a given exchange, NoPreJV is the 
number of previous joint venture events experienced by a given exchange, and NoPreAL
is the number of previous non-equity alliance events experienced by a given exchange. 
3.2.4. Exchange characteristics 
We also control for stock exchange specific characteristics including firm size, 
Tobin’s q, leverage, and cash flow. All these variables are measured at the fiscal year-end 
prior to the integration announcement. The source for these variables is the Worldscope 
database. Specifically, exchange size is defined as the log transformation of total assets 
(Log (TotalAssets)). Tobin’s q is the ratio of market value of assets over book value of 
assets (Q). Leverage refers to the total liabilities divided by total assets (Leverage) Cash 
flow is equal to operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, income 
taxes and capital expenditures, scaled by total assets (CashFlow).
3.2.5. Country-level variables 
We use the logarithm of GDP per capita and the logarithm of GDP growth to 
control for the countries’ macroeconomic conditions, which come from World 
Development Indicator. If two partnering stock exchanges located in different countries, 
the difference in legal system and language might create an integration barrier and reduce 
potential synergy gain. To control for these effects, we construct two dummy variables: 
SameLanguage, which equals one when two partnering stock exchanges’ countries share 
the same language reported in atlas and zero otherwise and SameLegalSystem, which 
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equals one when two partnering stock exchanges’ countries share the same legal origin 
reported in La Porta et al. (1998) and zero otherwise. 
To measure the difference in stock market development between the partner stock 
exchange’ country and the sample stock exchange’s country, we construct the difference 
of three variables that are from World Development Indicator: market capitalization of 
listed stock scaled by GDP, stock traded turnover ratio, and total value of stock traded 
scaled by GDP (DifMarketToGDP, DifTurnover and DifStockTradeToGDP). We took the 
country-level indices on shareholder rights and accounting standards, and the efficiency 
of the legal system, from La Porta et al. (1998) to measure the potential governance 
transfer effect because stock exchange governance mechanism can be regarded as a 
concrete manifestation of country-level investor protection in the securities markets 
(Frost et al., 2006). Then we use the product of the shareholder rights index and the 
efficiency of the legal system to construct the index of shareholder protection. The 
difference of the corresponding indices (shareholder protection index and accounting 
standards) between the partner stock exchange’ country and the sample stock exchange’s 
country (DifShareholderProtection and DifAccountingStandards) provides an indication 
of the difference in investor protection between the partnering stock exchanges’ countries.  
3.2.6. Summary statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of our variables used in the empirical test. 
Exchange performance measures and exchange characteristics are winsorized at the 1
st
and 99
th percentiles to eliminate the effect of outliers. The summary statistics of these 
variables are consistent with the findings reported in the existing literature. In Panel C, 
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we observe that some exchanges experience several M&A and alliance events in our 
sample period. For example, the maximum value of the previous M&A (NoPreMA), joint 
venture (NoPreJV) and alliances (NoPreAL) events are respectively 6, 3 and 11. As 
shown in Panels G and H, the mean values of the difference in capital market 
development and legal environment are all positive. These results suggest that most of the 
public stock exchanges are located in the countries with relatively more developed capital 
markets and legal systems. 
4. Tests and results 
4.1. Short-run stock abnormal return and the integration activities 
4.1.1. Event study findings 
We conduct an event study to measure the stock price response associated with 
the announcement of stock exchange M&As and alliances. Because of the multi-country 
nature of our event study and most of the capital markets around the world are influenced 
by the US market, we extend the market model by adding a US market return term to 
calculate abnormal return. The linear equation is specified as: 
it jt t US i jt m i i it e r r r ε β β α + + + + = ] [ , , 2 , , 1    (1) 
Where i is the exchange index, j is the country market index, t represents a one-day 
period time index and ri,t represents the daily rates of return. These variables are 
calculated for all stocks in our sample using DataStream’s total return index (RI), which 
includes dividends as well as price changes. rm,jtis a domestic market return, and rUS,t  is
the U.S market return.
 16, 17 The rate of change in the exchange rate per US dollar is ejt.
16 Local market index data is the exchange stock associated market index reported in DataStream.   
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When we calculate Equation (1) using US data, we set  i , 2 β to zero. The announcement 
day is day zero, the estimation period for the market model estimate begins on day -150 
and ends on day -31. We have set the cut-off at 30 days before the announcement date 
because one of the weakest points of event studies is information leakage, i.e., some 
inside information is known before the actual event announcement. However, this might 
not fully solve the problem if the mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances had 
been in the making for a long time. Nonetheless, based on Figure 1, the cut-off at 30 days 
before the announcement date reasonably avoids the information leakage problem. The 
graphs also show that establishing strategic relationships is good news and creates 
significant value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. 
Significance tests in our event study are based on a standardized parametric test 
statistic constructed to determine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly 
different than zero (see Mackinlay, 1997, for a detailed description of the test statistics 
and their calculation). Campbell et al. (2007) find that a non-parametric test does a better 
job than a parametric test in a multi-country event study. Thus, we also report the results 
of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the three-day cumulative abnormal return is a 
statistically significant 1.4% (Z-statistic = 2.24) for stock exchange M&As, 1.1% (Z-
statistic = 2.51) for stock exchange joint ventures and 0.95% (Z-statistic = 2.85) for stock 
exchange non-equity alliances. This evidence suggests that establishing strategic 
relationships creates significant value for the shareholders of the partnering stock 
exchanges. The non-parametric tests confirm these findings. 
17 We use the S&P 500 index to calculate US market return. When we use the Dow Jones Index to calculate 
US market return, we obtain similar results. 
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Our finding that average stock price responses around the announcement of stock 
exchange M&A and alliances are all significantly positive is consistent with the existing 
literature. Chang (1998) finds that in M&A involving a private target firm and stock 
payment, bidders experience a positive abnormal return. For the joint ventures, 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) find significant wealth gains from joint ventures. For the 
non-equity alliance, Chan et al. (1997) reveal that the average stock price response to the 
formation of a non-equity alliance is positive. 
Panel B of Table 4 compares cumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] among two of the 
three groups of events: stock exchange M&As, joint ventures and non-equity alliances. 
The mean value of cumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] of stock exchange M&As is 
significantly higher than that of joint ventures (T-statistic = 4.42).
18 Similarly, the mean 
value of the cumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] of stock exchange joint ventures is 
significantly higher than that of non-equity alliances (T-statistic = 4.28). 
We further classify our sample into different groups to examine the patterns in 
subsamples. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the three-day cumulative abnormal return is 
statistically significant 2% (Z-statistic = 3.05) for cross-border stock exchange M&As, 
1.13% (Z-statistic = 2.62) for cross-border stock exchange joint ventures and 1.3% (Z-
statistic = 3.92) for cross-border stock exchange alliances. The three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns for cross-border integration events are higher and more pronounced 
than for other integration events. In contrast, the three-day cumulative abnormal return is 
not statistically significant and has a lower mean value for domestic integration events. 
18 We acknowledge that sample acquisitions all appear to be partially stock financed. This should place 
some negative downward pressure on bidder returns because of the usual method-of-payment effect arising 
from negative information revelation when stock is issued. This will impart a negative bias on the estimates 
of the value creation accruing to bidding shareholders from the consummation of a deal.
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This evidence suggests that more value accrues for the shareholders of the partnering 
stock exchanges where cross-border strategic relationships are established. The non-
parametric tests (sign tests) confirm these findings. Panel B of Table 5 shows similar 
results, suggesting that more value accrues for the shareholders of the partnering stock 
exchanges where horizontal strategic relationships are established. 
Six acquirers are publicly traded exchanges in seven uncompleted M&A deals. 
We examine the stock price response for ther acquirer stock exchange when the deal 
failed. The results are shown in Panel C of Table 5. We observe that the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return is a statistically significant -2.76% (Z-statistic = -3.78) for 
acquirer stock exchanges, insignificant 0.14% (Z-statistic = 0.03) for target stock 
exchanges in failed M&As. These results suggest that failed M&As reduce shareholder 
value of acquirer exchanges. 
As indicated earlier, in our sample there are three M&As, four joint ventures and 
seven non-equity-alliances for which price data are available for two partners. In this sub-
sample, we examine whether there are wealth transfers between the larger and smaller 
partners in the alliance. We use the market value of each firm's common stock 31 trading 
days before the announcement of the integration to measure the relative size. Panel D of 
Table 5 compares the average cumulative abnormal return [-1, 1], the average market 
value on event day - 31, and the change in wealth in the time interval [-1, 1] around the 
announcement day (market value on event day -31 multiplied by the average abnormal 
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In three M&As deals, The average market value of the acquirers is $4,022.33 
million, which is on average more than three times that of the targets ($1,065.45 million). 
Both acquirer and target exchanges experience a significant three-day cumulative 
abnormal return. These results also suggest that the target exchanges in the M&As 
receive a larger abnormal return than the acquirer exchanges. However, the wealth gains 
are almost equal. 
In four joint ventures and seven non-equity alliances, the average market value of 
the larger partner is on average more than ten times that of the smaller ones. The smaller 
exchanges experience a significant three-day cumulative abnormal return. The larger 
exchanges experience an insignificant cumulative abnormal. These results suggest that 
smaller exchanges in the alliance receive a larger abnormal return than the larger 
exchange. However, the wealth gains are almost equal. We also test the potential wealth 
transfer between the larger and smaller exchange. The evidence shows that the 
correlation between the wealth increases experienced by the paired larger and smaller 
exchange is not significant. These results imply that the wealth is created by the 
formation of exchange joint venture and non-equity alliances and there is no evidence of 
wealth transfer between the partners. 
4.1.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section, we analyze the cross-sectional differences in the short-run 
abnormal returns for the M&A and alliance announcements using regression analysis. 
The model specification is as follows: 
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CAR[-1,1]=Įi+ȕ1DealCharacteristics+ȕ2LearningByDoing+ȕ3ExchangeCharactistics+ȕ4 
MacroDevelopment +ȕ5 TechnologicalIntegration+ȕ6 DifLegalandLanguage +İ   (2) 
where the dependent variable CAR[-1, 1] is the three-day announcement abnormal return. 
The independent variable DealCharacteristics includes InterType (equal to 0 when the 
deal is an M&A, 1 when the deal is a joint venture, and 2 when the deal is a non-equity 
alliance), Crossborder (equal to 1 when the deal is a cross-border transaction, otherwise 
0), and Horizontal (equal to 1 when the deal is a horizontal transaction, otherwise 0). We 
use the number of previous integration activities (NoPreMA, NoPreJV and NoPreAL) to 
measure learning-by-doing effects (LearningByDoing). The variables to control for 
exchange characteristics (ExchangeCharactistics) include exchange size 
(Log(TotalAssets)), Tobin’s q (Q), leverage (Leverage), and cash flow (CashFlow). We 
use the logarithm of GDP per capita (Log(GDPPerCapital)) and the logarithm of GDP 
growth (Log(GDPGrowth)) to control for the countries’ macroeconomic developments 
(MacroDevelopment). We also control for the type of technological integration 
(TechnologicalIntegration) in the regression, whether it is mainly outsourcing, common 
access, common systems, common operations, complete system integration, or some 
other type of integration. We use the variable Samelanguage and SameLegalSystem to 
control for the difference in language and legal system (DifLegalandLanguage). Country 
and year fixed effects are also included in our estimation. 
We argue that there are no potential endogeneity issues between exchange 
integration events and value creation although there are various motives for these 
activities. First, with regards to reverse causality, if stock return was already increasing it 
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should not encourage an integration activity. In contrast, low initial stock return may 
cause the integration events to occur, but this does not result in any statistical problems. 
In addition, these particular exchanges may have decided to pursue and adopt a certain 
type of integration (M&As, joint ventures or alliances) because of relatively low turnover. 
However, such a selection issue does not bias our statistical analysis. The regression 
coefficients still capture the effects of the integration activities on shareholder value 
creation. Second, in theory there may be a third factor causing both shareholder value 
creation and integration events to occur, leading to omitted variable problems. However, 
if the variables, which cause stock return to go up, were already improving before the 
events, there would be no reason to integrate in the first place. Thus, even though 
variation in a third factor may cause stock return to increase, it will not simultaneously be 
driving integrations events and thereby induce omitted variable problems. 
The results are shown in Table 6. We uncover three important findings. First, 
more value accrues when the deal is a stock exchange M&A compared with a joint 
venture or alliance. Second, horizontal stock exchange integration activities create more 
synergies than vertical ones. Finally, cross-border stock exchange integration activities 
create more synergies than vertical ones. These results are not only statistically 
significant, but also economically significant. On average, the three-day cumulative 
abnormal return of exchange M&As (joint ventures) is on average 0.7% higher than that 
of exchange joint ventures (non-equity alliances). The three-day cumulative abnormal 
return of horizontal integrations is 2.8% higher than that of vertical integrations. Cross 
border consolidations generate abnormal returns 2.4% higher than domestic ones. 
 2010 June30
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1201
In contrast to vertical initiatives, horizontal stock exchange integration activities 
create synergies. This finding is consistent with the results reported in the existing 
literature. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Bhagat et al. (1990) and Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992) show that only mergers between firms in related businesses are likely to generate 
operating synergies. Johnson and Houston (2000) reveal that only horizontal joint 
ventures create value for shareholders while vertical ones do not. Chan et al. (1997) find 
that when non-equity alliances involve a transfer or pooling of technology, the average 
stock price response is positive for horizontal alliances and there is no significant 
abnormal return for vertical ones. 
It is worth emphasizing that the coefficients of the learning-by-doing variables 
(NoPreMA, NoPreJV and NoPreAL) are negative and statistically significant. If the 
exchange experienced one more M&A (joint venture, non-equity alliance), the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return of the next integration activity will increase by 0.012% 
(0.010%, 0.014%). Thus, we find evidence to suggest that exchanges engaging in 
integration activities tend to perform better after they have some experience from 
previous integration activities. This finding most likely reflects the fact that complicated 
and different regulations in various countries encountered by stock exchanges make 
previous experiences valuable. We also find that exchange size (Log (TotalAssets)) is 
inversely related to abnormal return. These results are consistent with the existing 
literature. The coefficients of SameLanguage and SameLegalSystem are both 
insignificantly positive. These results are not reported for the brevity. 
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4.1.3. The impact of the difference in market development 
In cross-border deals, the difference in stock market development between two 
partners’ countries might also influence shareholder value creation. The more developed 
a stock market is, the more liquidity it can provide. Thus, when the partnering stock 
exchange locates in the country with a more developed stock market, there should be 
more synergy gain from increased liquidity. In this sub-section, we examine how the 
difference in capital market development between the countries of the partnering stock 
exchanges influences the abnormal return. The model specification is as follows: 
CAR[1,1]=Į+ȕ1 DealCharacteristics+ȕ2 LearningByDoing+ȕ3 ExchangeCharactistics+ȕ4 
MacroDevelopment +ȕ5 TechnologicalIntegration+ȕ6 DifLegalandLanguage+ȕ7 
DifMarketDevelopment + İ   (3)
Compared with equation (2), we add another term (DifMarketToGDP, DifTurnover or
DifStockTradeToGDP) to measure the difference in capital market development between 
the countries of the participating stock exchanges (DifMarketDevelopment).
19 As shown 
in Table 7, our main results do not change. The coefficients of the variables 
DifMarketToGDP, DifTurnover and  DifStockTradeToGDP are significantly negative. 
One percentage of difference in the capital market development between the partner stock 
exchange’s country and the sample exchange’s country (measured by market 
capitalization of listed stock scaled by GDP) will lead to a 0.169% increase of the three-
day cumulative abnormal return. These results suggest that the better the capital market 
19 Because these three variables are correlated, we add one into the regression equation at a time. 
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development in the partner’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium for our 
sample exchange. 
4.1.4. The impact of the difference in governance  
Similarly, the stock exchange with relatively low governance standards may 
benefit from the governance transfer effect in the process of the consolidation. Frost et al. 
(2006) argue that stock exchange governance mechanism is a concrete manifestation of 
country-level investor protection in the securities markets. Thus, when the partnering 
stock exchange locates in the country with higher investor protection, there should be 
more synergy gain for our sample exchange from increased governance effects. In this 
sub-section, we assemble country-level corporate governance indices and seek to 
examine how the difference in the legal environment of the countries of the stock 
exchanges influences the abnormal return. The model specification is as follows: 
CAR[1,1]=Į+ȕ1 DealCharacteristics+ȕ2 LearningByDoing+ȕ3 ExchangeCharactistics+ȕ4 
MacroDevelopmenti +ȕ5 TechnologicalIntegration+ȕ6 DifLegalandLanguage  +ȕ7 
DifMarketDevelopment  + ȕ8 DifGovernance +İ  (4) 
Compared with equation (3), we add another term (DifShareholderProtection  or 
DifAccountingStandards) to measure the difference in the legal environment between the 
countries of the stock exchanges (DifGovernance).
20  As shown in Table 8, our main 
20 Because these three variables are correlated, we add one into the regression equation at a time. 
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results still hold.
21  The coefficients of the variables DifShareholderProtection  and 
DifAccountingStandards are significantly positive. One percentage of difference in the 
legal environment between the partner exchange’s country and the sample exchange’s 
country (measured by the shareholder protection index) will increase the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return by 0.028%. These results suggest that the better the legal 
system in the partner’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium. 
4.2. Long-run abnormal return and the integration activities
From a stock exchange shareholder’s viewpoint, the long-run stock return after 
the integrations might be more important and valuable than the short-run stock return. By 
looking at the long-term patterns in stock returns, we are able to test whether the positive 
reaction to the exchange integration is a sign of temporary optimism by investors who 
newly gain remote access in equity trading, or whether the price reaction is permanent 
implying an increase in the shareholders’ wealth. To formally address this issue, first, we 
examine the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return of the partnering exchange. The 
three-year period includes the following 36 months where months are defined as 
successive 21-trading-day periods relative to the announcement date. Thus, month 1 
consists of event days 2-22; month 2 consists of event days 23-43, etc. The three-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal return BHAR1, 36  is calculated as below: 






, 36 , 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t m t i R R BHAR  (5) 
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where Ri,t is the monthly return and Rm,t is the benchmark return, which is the value-
weighted exchange industry return.
22, 23 
The results show that the three-year abnormal return is significantly positive. The 
t-statistic is 3.34 in T-test; the z-statistic is 3.12 in Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
24 These 
results suggest that partnering exchanges outperform the value-weighted exchange 
industry return over the three-year horizon. 
In addition, we use the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return BHAR1, 36 as the 
dependent variable and conduct a multivariate analysis. The model specification is as 
follows: 
BHAR1,36=Į+ȕ1DealCharacteristicsi+ȕ2LearningByDoing+ȕ3ExchangeCharactistics+ȕ4 
MacroDevelopment +ȕ5 TechnologicalIntegrationi+ȕ6 DifLegalandLanguage +ȕ7 
DifMarketDevelopment + ȕ8 DifGovernance + İ   (6) 
The results are reported in Table 9. The findings are consistent with the results of 
the short-run abnormal return analysis. First, there is more improvement in long-run 
abnormal return when the deal is an M&A compared with a joint venture or an alliance. 
Second, horizontal (cross-border) stock exchange integration activities have higher long-
run abnormal return for the stock exchange than vertical (domestic) ones. We also find 
that the learning-by-doing effect still holds in terms of the stock exchange’s accounting 
22 Whether we use market index return or equal-weighted industry average return as the bench return, we 
draw the same conclusion. The results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
23 When we calculate the value-weighted industry return for a sample exchange, we do not include that 
sample exchange. 
24 See Barber and Lyon (1997) for more details about various measures and statistical tests used to detect 
long-run abnormal return. 
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ratio performance. Finally, the better the shareholder protection, accounting standards, 
and capital market development in the partner’s country, the higher long-run abnormal 
return for the stock exchange.  
4.3. Accounting performance, liquidity, IPO and the integration activities
In this subsection, we use accounting ratios, i.e. ROA and ROE, to measure 
exchange performance. These accounting ratios capture actual financial performance over 
a period of time, while market returns are forward-looking measures of expected 
earnings.
25  First, we calculate industry-adjusted accounting performance measures by 
subtracting asset-weighted industry performance from the levels of each of two 
performance metrics (ROA and ROE) in the years -2 and +2.
26,27 Using  T-tests  and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the evidence shows that industry-adjusted accounting 
performance measures are significantly positive in the years tested. The results suggest 
that exchanges entering into M&A and alliances tend to display superior performance 
relative to their industry counterparts both prior to and after the announcement of 
integration activities. We also use T-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to determine 
whether the differences in industry-adjusted performance measures between the year -2 
and the year +2 are statistically significant. We find evidence that performance improves 
significantly from the year -2 to the year +2.
28 Second, we conduct a multivariate analysis 
25 We acknowledge that firms often take write-offs around major corporate control events. This makes it 
hard to compare operating performance before and after the integration activities. 
26 When calculating asset-weighted industry performance for a sample exchange, we do not include that 
sample exchange. 
27 When we use equal-weighted industry average accounting performance, we obtain the similar results. 
The results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
28 A copy of the test results associated with all the performance metrics is available from the author upon 
request. See Barber and Lyon (1996) for more details of various measures of performance and statistical 
tests used to detect abnormal operating performance. 
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to examine which characteristics contribute to improving exchanges’ long-run accounting 
performance. The model specification is as follows: 
ChangeofPerfromance=Į+ȕ1 DealCharacteristics+ȕ2 LearningByDoing+ȕ3
ExchangeCharactistics+ȕ4 MacroDevelopment +ȕ5 TechnologicalIntegration+ȕ6 
DifLegalandLanguage +ȕ7 DifMarketDevelopment + ȕ8 DifGovernance +İ   (7) 
where the dependent variable ChangeofPerformance is the difference in industry-
adjusted ROA or ROE for integration i between the year +2 and the year -2. The results 
are reported in Table 10. First, the performance increases more when the deal is a stock 
exchange M&A compared with a joint venture or an alliance. Second, horizontal (cross-
border) stock exchange integration activities increase performance more for the stock 
exchange than vertical (domestic) ones. Finally, the better the shareholder protection, 
accounting standards, and capital market development in the partner’s country, the better 
accounting ratio performance for the stock exchange. These patterns are consistent with 
the results when we investigate exchanges’ short-run and long-run abnormal return. 
The exchange accounting performance are mainly driven by the revenue from 
trading and IPOs. Thus, we examine the pattern in liquidity and IPO after the 
announcement of integration activities. We obtain the data from the website of World 
Exchange Federation. The exchange liquidity is measured as the value of share trading 
divided by market capitalization of listed stocks. The exchange IPOs is measured as the 
market capitalization of IPOs divided by market capitalization of listed stocks. Similar to 
industry-adjusted accounting performance measures, we construct two variables: 
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industry-adjusted liquidity and industry-adjusted IPOs and do a multivariate analysis. As 
shown in Table 11, we obtain similar results compared with those we obtain when we 
examine the accounting performance. 
4.4. Robustness tests 
To make sure our results are not driven by a specific model, we examine another 
model based on Jin and Myers (2006) incorporating lagged market returns to avoid the 
influence of nonsynchronous trading. We use different event windows, i.e. [-2, 2] and [-3, 
3] to calculate abnormal return. We also calculate heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics by 
regressing CAR[-1,1] on an intercept. For the four joint venture announcements and the 
seven non-equity alliance announcements for which we have return data on multiple 
partners, we combine the returns of all partners in the same joint venture or non-equity 
alliance to form a value-weighted portfolio using the market values of the partner firms 
on event day - 31 as weights. We then treat the portfolio as a single observation in 
conducting our event study. By combining the returns of partner firms in a given non-
equity alliance, we avoid the problem of a lack of independence in sample observations 
because there may be a correlation in the partner firms’ returns. These procedures do not 
qualitatively change our findings.
29
5. Summary and conclusions 
We provide evidence concerning the impact of M&As and strategic alliances on 
the wealth of the partnering stock exchanges’ shareholders. We find significant positive 
wealth effects, on average, from the formation of such M&As and alliances. These results 
29 The results are available upon request, although not reported. 
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support the conjecture that global exchange integration activities may well promote the 
efficiency of cross-border capital flows and increased governance standards, and thus 
have the potential to create value for their shareholders. We acknowledge that the 
consolidation of exchanges may reduce competition and opportunities for cross-listings in 
the future. Thus, the loss to future consumers should be properly deducted from the 
benefit to current shareholders. 
We also find that stock exchange alliances lead to the creation of less value for 
both partner firms than joint ventures. Similarly, less value accrues through stock 
exchange joint ventures compared with M&As. By examining what types of stock 
exchange integration activities have the greatest wealth impact on the partnering 
exchanges, we find that horizontal integration activities tend to produce larger wealth 
effects than vertical ones. In addition, cross-border integration activities tend to produce 
larger wealth effects than domestic ones. Additionally, there is evidence of learning-by-
doing in stock exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that the better the 
shareholder protection, accounting standards and capital market development in the 
partner exchange’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium for our sample 
exchange. These patterns are consistent when we examine the long-run performance 
measures such as the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, the change in ROA 
(ROE), the change in liquidity and the change in market capitalization of IPO between 
the year +2 and the year -2. 
The results of this paper may prove to be instructive for managers of stock 
exchanges. In general, the use of M&As and alliances by stock exchanges creates value 
for their shareholders. Furthermore, expanding horizontally into international markets 
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provides stock exchanges with the opportunity to capitalize on their domestic expertise 
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Figure 1 Cumulative return around announcement of stock exchange M&A, joint venture 
and non-equity alliance 
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Table 1 Public stock exchange in our sample  
This table describes 14 public stock exchange companies in our sample, the country in which their 
headquarters are located, the stock exchanges in which they are listed and the Datastream code for their 
stocks. 
No.  Public stock exchange company  Country in which its  
headquarter is located
Stock exchange in which it is listed Datastream code  
for its stock 
        
1  Australian securities exchange  Australia  Australian securities exchange  675705 
2  Chicago board of trade  United States  New York stock exchange  30965P 
3  Chicago mercantile exchange  United States  NASDAQ  26393N 
4  Deutsche Boerse  Germany  Frankfurt stock exchange  13454U 
5 Euronext  France  Paris  bourse  259413 
6  Hong Kong stock exchange  Hong Kong (China)  Hong Kong stock exchange  280037 
7  London stock exchange  United Kingdom  London stock exchange  298593 
8 NASDAQ  United  States  NASDAQ  25735K 
9  New York stock exchange  United States  New York stock exchange  28560F 
10 OMX  exchanges  Sweden  Stockholm  exchange  504592 
11  Osaka securities exchange  Japan  Osaka securities exchange  28545H 
12  Sao Paulo stock exchange  Brazil  Sao Paulo stock exchange  51216L 
13  Singapore exchange  Singapore  Singapore exchange  280738 
14  TSX group  Canada  Toronto exchange  26492L 
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Table 2 Announcements of stock exchange M&As and alliances 
This table presents the sample distributions by year and type of integrations. 
Year of announcement  Number of announcements   Percentage of total 
    
2000 5  4.55 
2001 8  7.27 
2002 8  7.27 
2003 12  10.91 
2004 13  11.82 
2005 14  12.73 
2006 20  18.18 
2007 28  25.45 
2008 2  1.82 
    
Total 110  100 
Panel A: Annual distribution of stock exchange integration activities 
    
Type of  integration activities  Number of announcements   Percentage of total 
Horizontal 93  84.55 
Vertical 17  15.45 
    
Cross-border 99  90.00 
Domestic 11  10.00 
Panel B: Distribution of stock exchange integration activities by type 
    
Type of  technological integration  Number of announcements   Percentage of total 
Outsourcing 17  15.45 
Common access  9  8.18 
Common systems  5  4.55 
Common operation  6  5.45 
Complete system integration  16  14.55 
Other type of integration  55  50.00 
Panel C: Distribution of stock exchange integration activities by  type of technological integration 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics. Performance measures and exchange characteristics are 
winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B.
Variable          Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
        
CAR [-1, 1] (%)  121  1.08  0.33  -5.96  6.48 
BHAR1, 36 (%)  70 97.37  26.45  -66.56  212.44 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROE between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  52  7.89  2.45  -4.93  16.52 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROA between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  60  3.25  0.81  -2.47  8.01 
Difference in industry-adjusted exchange liquidity between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  58  0.12  0.04  -0.15  0.27 
Difference in industry-adjusted exchange IPO between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  58  0.11  0.03  -0.13  0.28 
Panel A: Exchange performance measures    
        
InterType  121 1.36  0.87  0.00  3.00 
Horizontal  121 0.82  0.39  0.00  1.00 
CrossBorder  121 0.89  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Public 121 0.12  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Panel B: Deal characteristics    
        
NoPreMA  121 1.21  1.73  0.00  6.00 
NoPreJV  121 0.54  0.85  0.00  3.00 
NoPreAL  121 3.08  2.76  0.00 11.00 
Panel C: Learning-by-doing variables     
          
MarketValue ($ millions)  121  4,045.91 5,841.73 12.86  34,753.22 
TotalAssets ($ millions)  116  7,292.16 14,817.00 30.70 60,535.95 
CashFlow 116 0.11  0.10  0.01  0.41 
Leverage  112 0.59  0.17  0.39  0.79 
Q 112 2.74  2.07  1.11  8.66 
Panel D: Exchange characteristics    
        
GDPPerCapita ($)  91  25,867.41  8,831.08  949.18  39,824.08 
GDPGrowth (%)  91  2.99  2.41  -2.40  10.00 
Panel E: Difference in language and legal system          
        
SameLanguage  121 0.54  0.22  0.00  1.00 
SameLegalSystem 121  0.33  0.21  0.00  1.00 
Panel F: Macroeconomic development variables    
        
DifMarketToGDP (%)  91  0.18  0.77  -2.62  2.43 
DifTurnOver (%)  90  0.20  0.58  -1.54  1.59 
DifStockTradeToGDP (%)  91  0.28  0.90  -2.52  1.91 
Panel G: Difference in  capital market development    
        
DifShareholderProtection 75  2.79  20.68  -41.00  50.00 
DifAccountingStandards  71 4.66  13.41  -21.00  59.00 
Panel H: Difference in governance    
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Table 4 Cumulative return [-1, 1] around announcement of stock exchange M&A, joint 
venture and non-equity alliance 
This table presents the results of the event study in different subsamples. *, ** and *** stand for 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Event type 
Number of 
observations  CAR [-1, 1] (%)  Z-statistic 
Proportion of positive 
value (sign test) 
M&A 30  1.4  2.24*  73.33%*** 
Joint venture  20  1.1  2.51*  70%* 
Non-equity alliance  71  0.95  2.85**  69.44%** 
Panel A: Announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] 
        
Two group of events 
Number of 
observations  Difference of CAR [-1, 1] (%)  T-statistic 
P value (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test) 
M&A and joint venture  50  0.33  4.42***  0.01*** 
M&A and non-equity alliance  101  0.44  4.56***  0.03** 
Joint venture and non-equity alliance  91  0.11  4.28***  0.01*** 
Panel B: Comparison of announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] among M&A, joint ventures, and non-equity alliances
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Table 5 Cumulative return [-1, 1] around announcement of stock exchange M&A, joint 
venture and non-equity alliance in sub-sample 
This table presents the results of the event study in different subsamples. *, ** and *** stand for 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Event type 
Number of 
observations  CAR [-1, 1] (%)  Z-statistic 
Proportion of positive value 
 (sign test) 
Cross-border M&A  23  2.00   3.05***  78%** 
Domestic M&A  7  -0.59   -0.37  57% 
       
Cross-border joint venture  19  1.13  2.62***  74%* 
Domestic joint venture  1  -0.23  -0.12  0% 
       
Cross-border non-equity alliance  66  1.3  3.92***  71%*** 
Domestic non-equity alliance  5  -3.7  -2.21  40% 
Panel A: Comparison of announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] between cross-border and domestic deals 
       
Event type 
Number of 
observations  CAR [-1, 1] (%)  Z-statistic 
Proportion of positive value 
 (sign test) 
Horizontal M&A  22  1.88   2.66***  77%** 
Vertical M&A  8  0.05   0.04  63% 
       
Horizontal joint venture  15  1.24  2.82***  73%* 
Vertical joint venture 5  0.51  0.5  60% 
       
Horizontal non-equity alliance  62  1.1  3.47***  69%*** 
Vertical non-equity alliance  9  -0.6  -0.51  66% 
Panel B: Comparison of announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] between horizontal and vertical deals 
Exchange type 
Number of 
observations  CAR [-1, 1] (%)  Z-statistic 
Proportion of positive value 
 (sign test) 
Acquirer exchange  6  -2.76   -3.78***  0%*** 
Target exchange  5  0.14  0.03  25% 
Panel C: Analysis of  failed M&A deals 
Exchange type 
Number of 
observations  CAR [-1, 1] (%)  Z-statistic 
Mean market  
value ($m.) 
Mean change in  
wealth ($m.) 
Acquirer exchange  3  0.90  4.33***  4,022.33  36.20 
Target exchange  3  2.83  4.55***  1,065.45  30.15 
      
Lager joint venture partner  4  0.21 0.99  3,300.12 6.93 
Smaller joint venture partner  4  2.55  6.33***  280.54  7.15 
      
Larger alliance partner  7  0.18  1.05  3,046.41  5.48 
Smaller alliance partner  7  2.23  6.12***  230.82  5.15 
Panel D: Analysis of  wealth effects by relative partner size
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Table 6 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon announcement 
The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable 
definitions are given in Appendix B. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
Dependent variable  CAR[-1, 1] 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Deal characteristics       
InterType -0.674*  -0.598***  -0.550***  -1.101** 
  (-1.761)  (-4.493) (-4.389) (-2.015) 
Horizontal 2.819**  2.800**  2.463*  3.072* 
 (2.270)  (2.227)  (1.802)  (1.930) 
CrossBorder 2.362**  2.376**  2.028***  2.149*** 
 (2.069)  (2.006)  (3.499)  (3.185) 
Public  0.002  0.006 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Leaning-by-doing variables       
NoPreMA    0.012*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 
   (4.684)  (3.359)  (3.259) 
NoPreJV    0.010*** 0.017*** 0.031*** 
   (4.019)  (4.499)  (4.715) 
NoPreAL    0.014*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
   (5.563)  (4.379)  (4.629) 
Exchange characteristics       
Log(TotalAssets)     -0.647*  -0.369*** 
     (-1.853)  (-4.653) 
Q     0.337  0.053 
     (1.310)  (0.145) 
Leverage     -3.131  -0.166 
     (-1.269)  (-0.034) 
CashFlow     0.021  0.076 
     (0.378)  (1.057) 
Macroeconomic variables       
Log(GDPPerCapita)       -1.029 
       (-1.556) 
Log(GDPGrowth)       0.336 
       (0.578) 
Control for             
Technological integration dummy variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.14  0.12 0.16 0.19 
No. of observations        121  121  112  83 
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Table 7 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon announcement controlling for the 
difference in capital market development 
The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable 
definitions are given in Appendix B. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
Dependent variable  CAR[-1,1] 
(1) (2) (3) 
Deal characteristics 
InterType -1.135*  -1.136**  -1.092* 
  (-1.996) (-2.017) (-1.979) 
Horizontal  3.127* 3.081* 3.055* 
  (1.935) (1.891) (1.904) 
CrossBorder  2.099*** 2.129*** 2.179*** 
  (4.135) (4.189) (4.199) 
Public  0.002 0.002 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Leaning-by-doing variables 
NoPreMA  0.021*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  (4.184) (5.208) (4.271) 
NoPreJV  0.016*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 
  (4.739) (4.789) (4.703) 
NoPreAL  0.014*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 
  (4.646) (4.634) (3.890) 
     
Difference in capital market development 
DifMarketToGDP -0.169***     
 (-4.289)     
DifTurnover   -0.161***   
   (-5.178)   
DifStockTradeToGDP     -0.073*** 
     (-4.146) 
Control for          
Exchange  characteristics  Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic  variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal  environment  Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.19 0.20 0.20 
No. of observations  83  81  83 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon announcement controlling for the 
difference in governance 
The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable 
definitions are given in Appendix B. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
Dependent variable  CAR[-1,1] 
(1) (2) 
Deal characteristics 
InterType -0.942***  -1.033*** 
 (-4.237)  (-4.459) 
Horizontal 1.914***  2.435*** 
 (5.034)  (4.468) 
CrossBorder 1.844***  2.107*** 
 (5.980)  (4.224) 
Public 0.004  0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.008) 
Leaning-by-doing variables 
NoPreMA 0.019***  0.013*** 
 (4.601)  (4.423) 
NoPreJV 0.017***  0.019*** 
 (4.033)  (4.089) 
NoPreAL 0.013***  0.023*** 
 (4.688)  (4.389) 
Difference in capital market development 
DifTurnover -0.057***  -0.045*** 
 (-4.067)  (-4.398) 
Difference in governance 
DifShareholderProtection   -0.028***   
 (-3.931)   
DifAccountingStandards   -0.135*** 
   (-2.799) 
Control for       
Exchange characteristics  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  Yes  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.21  0.22 
No. of observations  54  51 
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Table 9 Cross-sectional analysis of three-year BHARs  
The dependent variable is the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix B. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Dependent variable  BHAR(1, 36)
(1) (2) 
Deal characteristics 
InterType -3.823***  -3.316*** 
 (-4.289)  (-5.855) 
Horizontal 8.145***  16.679*** 
 (4.178)  (5.135) 
CrossBorder 3.835***  3.465*** 
 (4.389)  (4.289) 
Public 0.013  0.015 
 (0.005)  (0.009) 
Leaning-by-doing variables 
NoPreMA 1.186***  1.435*** 
 (4.688)  (5.455) 
NoPreJV 1.102***  1.136*** 
 (4.299)  (4.357) 
NoPreAL 1.166***  1.176*** 
 (4.279)  (5.156) 
Difference in capital market development 
DifTurnover   -1.206*** 
   (-4.198) 
Difference in governance 
DifShareholderProtection   -1.146*** 
   (-4.556) 
Control for       
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.19  0.42 
No. of observations    70  40 
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Table 10 Cross-sectional analysis of exchange accounting performance  
The dependent variable is the difference in the industry-adjusted ROA or the industry-adjusted ROE 
between the year +2 and the year -2. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. In brackets are t-
statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** 
stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Dependent variable 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROA 
between the year +2 and the year -2 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROE 
between the year +2 and the year -2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal characteristics 
InterType -0.652***  -0.252***  -1.445***  -0.944*** 
 (-5.371)  (-4.699)  (-5.849)  (-5.371) 
Horizontal 1.914***  3.450***  4.951***  5.737*** 
 (5.513)  (6.211)  (5.224)  (6.321) 
CrossBorder 0.520***  0.215***  2.261***  1.864*** 
 (5.277)  (6.414)  (5.505)  (6.069) 
Public 0.006  0.009  0.012  0.011 
 (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Leaning-by-doing variables      
NoPreMA 0.062***  0.214***  0.027***  0.068*** 
 (3.342)  (4.209)  (4.296)  (5.251) 
NoPreJV 0.081***  0.015***  0.046***  0.015*** 
 (5.878)  (4.825)  (5.020)  (4.804) 
NoPreAL 0.043***  0.039***  0.013***  0.066*** 
 (5.954)  (4.556)  (6.036)  (4.256) 
Difference in capital market development      
DifTurnover   -0.089***    -0.135*** 
   (-4.199)    (-5.502) 
Difference in governance      
DifShareholderProtection   -0.029***    -0.106*** 
   (-4.529)    (-5.815) 
Control for       
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.19  0.47  0.16  0.33 
No. of observations    60  34  52  33 
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Table 11 Cross-sectional analysis of exchange liquidity and IPO 
The dependent variable is the difference in the industry-adjusted exchange liquidity or the industry-adjusted 
exchange IPO between the year +2 and the year -2. Variable definitions are given in Appendix B. In 
brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, 
** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Dependent variable 
Difference in industry-adjusted 
exchange liquidity between the year +2 
and the year -2 
Difference in industry-adjusted 
exchange IPO between the year +2 and 
the year -2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal characteristics 
InterType -0.032***  -0.024***  -0.025***  -0.024*** 
 (-4.234)  (-4.498)  (-4.367)  (-4.813) 
Horizontal 0.193***  0.325***  0.705***  0.245*** 
 (4.893)  (6.011)  (4.689)  (5.067) 
CrossBorder 0.048***  0.025***  0.039***  0.018*** 
 (4.145)  (5.245)  (4.654)  (5.121) 
Public 0.007  0.009  0.006  0.004 
 (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Leaning-by-doing variables      
NoPreMA 0.006***  0.024***  0.007***  0.017*** 
 (4.392)  (4.681)  (4.643)  (4.224) 
NoPreJV 0.007***  0.003***  0.008***  0.004*** 
 (5.145)  (4.244)  (5.876)  (4.133) 
NoPreAL 0.003***  0.005***  0.002***  0.004*** 
 (5.172)  (4.771)  (5.432)  (4.199) 
Difference in capital market development      
DifTurnover   -0.010***    -0.009*** 
   (-4.665)    (-4.115) 
Difference in governance      
DifShareholderProtection   -0.006***    -0.007*** 
   (-4.351)    (-4.135) 
Control for       
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.41  0.17  0.34 
No. of observations    58  36  58  35 
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Appendix A.  Sample descriptions of M&As and alliances 
  The following material provides a brief sample description of each of the types of 
cooperative agreements studied. The information for each description is taken directly 
from the news item used to identify the announcement of the events. 
A.1. M&As 
  At the NYSE Group’s first meeting as a public company, the chief executive, 
John A. Thain, complained that the United States was losing lucrative stock listings to 
markets overseas because of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Of the largest 25 initial public 
offerings last year, 23 did not list in the United States, he said. This year, 9 of the 10 
largest offerings went elsewhere. “That is a very negative statistic for the competitive 
position of the United States”, Mr. Thain said. 
After a whirlwind weekend of trans-Atlantic travel, Mr. Thain sealed a deal for 
the NYSE Group to buy Euronext, the pan-European stock and derivatives exchange, for 
$10.2 billion, forming the first trans-Atlantic marketplace. Euronext, which was formed 
from mergers of the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels stock exchanges, as well as the 
London derivatives exchange Liffe, will become part of NYSE Euronext, the American 
holding company that will be created. Regulators from each country where stocks trade 
will continue to oversee that activity. (The New York Times, June 2, 2006) 
A.2. Equity alliances (joint ventures) 
The American Stock Exchange, the global leader and pioneer in exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs) and Euronext, the first pan-European exchange, signed a memorandum of 
understanding to create a joint venture, subject to regulatory approval, to cross list and 
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trade US, European and other internationally sourced ETFs. The joint venture will be a 
part of a global network of ETF marketplaces aiming at offering the best facilities for 
trading, cross listing, information dissemination, and marketing of the products globally. 
Ultimately the partners hope to achieve seamless 24-hour global trading of ETFs.  
“Bringing Amex-listed ETFs to Europe, a critical market, is the essential next step 
in our strategy to develop a global ETF trading network”, said Salvatore F. Sodano, 
Amex chairman and chief executive officer. “The Amex-Euronext alliance is truly 
revolutionary, as it aims to provide investors with the opportunity to trade the same class 
of ETF shares across time zones.” (American Stock Exchange Official Website, February 
7, 2001) 
A.3. Non-equity alliances (simple contracts) 
In a deal that allies the two biggest stock markets in the world, the NYSE Group, 
parent of the New York Stock Exchange, confirmed that it had signed a letter of intent to 
form a strategic alliance with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The alliance calls for 
cooperation on joint listings, trading technology and marketing, with the possibility of 
investing in each other in the future. The exchange’s non-exclusive alliance with Tokyo – 
loosely defined and less substantive than its merger with Euronext or its ownership stake 
in India’s national stock exchange – is an agreement to work together, the chief 
executives from the two exchanges said. Working groups are in place to examine possible 
linkages in areas like trading technology, cross-listings, new products including 
exchange-traded funds and areas of corporate governance and regulation. (The New York 
Times, February 1, 2007) 
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Appendix B. Brief descriptions of all the variables and their sources 
Variables Description 
Exchange performance measures 
CAR [-1, 1]   Three-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage 
points) calculated using the extended market model. The 
extended market model parameters are estimated over 
the period (-150, -31) 
BHAR1, 36  Three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (in percentage 
points). The benchmark is the value-weighted exchange 
industry return 
Industry-adjusted ROE  ROE minus asset-weighted industry ROE (in percentage 
points)   
Industry-adjusted ROA  ROA minus asset-weighted industry ROA (in percentage 
points) 
Exchange liquidity  Value of share trading divided by market capitalization 
of  listed stocks 
Industry-adjusted exchange liquidity   Exchange liquidity minus asset-weighted industry 
exchange liquidity 
Exchange IPO   Market capitalization of IPOs divided by market 
capitalization of listed stocks 
Industry-adjusted exchange IPO  Exchange IPO minus asset-weighted industry exchange 
IPO
Deal characteristics 
InterType  It is equal to 0 when the deal is an M&A, 1 when the 
deal is a joint venture, and 2 when the deal is a non-
equity alliance 
Horizontal  It equals 1 when the deal is a horizontal transaction, 
otherwise 0 
CrossBorder  It is equal to 1 when the deal is a cross-border 
transaction, otherwise 0 
TechnologicalIntegration   Dummy variables to indicate the type of technological 
integration (outsourcing, common access, common 
systems, common operations, complete system 
integration, and other type of integration) 
Public  It is equal to 1 when the target exchange is a publicly 
traded exchange  in an M&A or the partner is a publicly 
traded exchange  in a joint venture (non-equity alliance), 
otherwise 0 
Learning-by-doing variables  
NoPreMA  The number of previous M&A events experienced by a 
given exchange  
NoPreJV  The number of previous joint venture events 
experienced by a given exchange 
NoPreAL  The number of previous non-equity alliance events 
experienced by a given exchange 
Exchange characteristics 
MarketValue  Market value on the 31st trading day prior to 
announcement date 
TotalAssets Total  assets 
CashFlow  Operating income before depreciation – interest 
expenses – income taxes – capital 
expenditures, scaled by total assets 
Leverage  Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
Q  Market value of assets over book value of assets 
Macroeconomic development variables 
GDPPerCapita  GDP per capita  
GDPGrowth GDP  growth 
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SameLanguage,   It equals one when two partnering stock exchanges’ 
countries share the same language and zero otherwise 
SameLegalSystem,   It equals one when two partnering stock exchanges’ 
countries share the same legal origin and zero otherwise 
Difference in capital market development 
DifMarketToGDP   The difference in the market capitalization of listed 
stock scaled by GDP between the partner stock 
exchange’ country and the sample stock exchange’s 
country 
DifTurnover  The difference in the stock traded turnover ratio between 
the partner stock exchange’ country and the sample 
stock exchange’s country 
DifStockTradeToGDP  The difference in the total value of stock traded scaled 
by GDP between the partner stock exchange’ country 
and the sample stock exchange’s country 
Difference in governance 
DifShareHolderProtection  The difference in the shareholder protection index (the 
product of the shareholder rights index and the 
efficiency of the legal system) between the partner stock 
exchange’ country and the sample stock exchange’s 
country 
DifAccountingStandard  The difference in accounting standard index between the 
partner stock exchange’ country and the sample stock 
exchange’s country 
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